The purpose of this paper is to philosophy and have not received professional training, but are engaged in professional ethics teaching university teachers teach to share my personal views of professional ethics. Basically, the professional ethics courses, each of us is being in the study. My idea is to敎good this course, we must first increase the individual's moral experience, and the introduction of the professional conduct of the consideration; Second, to strengthen their own for the professional in the most optimal (...) technology knowledge for professional societies code or the industry standard to be familiar with, discuss and reach a consensus, in addition, it should gradually increase their knowledge of the basic ethics. Among them, the benefits on to deontology, virtue theory by the obligation on the layers to turn into, should be more clearly identified, as well as any professional conduct, can be used to preserve, develop, free will, excellence and harmony criterion, training moral judgments, to implement in practice behavior. This is an essay on what university professors, not philosophically trained, should do when teaching professional ethics. Initially, they should employ ethical reflection toward their professional behavior. They should also familiarize themselves with optimal technical rules and professional ethical codes. Through these ethical values , they could then transform technical rules and codes of behavior into ethical rules. These rules could not be properly called ethical unless they brought these codes up to the level of ethical theory and ethical criteria. In this essay we will examine ethical theories such as utilitarianism , obligation ethics and virtue. We will then discuss five criteria derived from the theories: conservation, development, free will, excellence and harmony. In summation, we will refer them to concrete applications in professional ethics. (shrink)

RésuméAprès avoir déflni la Psychologie comme la science des personnaliés, de leurs activité au sein des situations qui les confrontent, et de leur développement dans un milieu physique, social et culturel donné, le Dr Murray formule un certain nombre de propositions et conceptions théo‐riques destinées à rendre compte des faits psychiques. Les unes sont ?ordre général, les autres concernent la motivation. Propositions générales. 1. La personnalitéà son siège dans le cerveau.2. Elle dure et se développe dans le temps par suite (...) des opérations qu'elle est amenée à produire.3. Ces opérations sont internes ou externes, et correspondent à des attitudes ?introversion ou ?extroversion. Toutes comportent une dimension temporelle, un début, un déroulement de longueur variable, une fin.4. Les opérations externes sont constituteées ?une série de champs momentanés , le champ lui‐même résultant de la combinaison ?une situation externe et ?un état interne. II importe de distinguer de la situation réelle, la situation telle que la voit le sujet. Cette distinction revêt une importance particulière dans le cas des relations sociales.5. Ľobjet ?étude du Psychologue consiste alors, non pas dans le comportement du seul sujet, mais dans ľinteraction du sujet et de ľobjet. Celle‐ci, avec ses deux aspects complémentaires de besoin et de pression est ce que le Dr Murray à appeié ailleurs un théme.6. Les actions Psychologiques s'ordonnént fréquemment en séquences tendant àľobtention ?un but éioigné. Les démarches intermédiates s'expliquent alors, non pas par ľinfluence des facteurs externes contemporains, mais par celle des facteurs internes antérieurs. Ce sont, non des réactions, mais des proactions. Elles ne sont pas homéostatiques et subor‐données à la restitution ?un équilibre antérieur, mais _HYPERLINK “superstatiqu.es” et visant à la production de quelque chose de neuf. Séquences et proactions composent pour une grande part ľego‐system.7. Ľévolution de la personnalité s'ordonné en périodes relativement longues dont il est possible de prendre au cours de brefs laps de temps une sorte ?échantillonnage.8. La personnalité fait montre ?une intégration variable, perceptible aux niveaux des opérations, des séquences ou des périodes.9. Elle se transforme sans cesse par ľeffet des opérations ou elle est engageée, ces transformations graduelles et insensibles pouvant s'accumuler jusquà déclencher à un moment donné des revirements spectaculaires tels que les conversions.10. Le donné du Psychologue est de deux sortes: faits subjectifs communiqués par le sujet, faits objectifs recueillis par ľobservateur extérieur. II importe ensuite ?expliquer ce donné, autrement dit de construire une représentation hypothétique du psychisme du sujet, qui permette de comprendre ses conduites passées et de prédire ses conduites futures. Ces constructions n'ont pas encore atteint le stade ?une tľpologie satisfaisante. Concepts relatifs à la motivation. Dans la représentation théorique dont il vient ?être parlé, une place éminente revient aux concepts relatifs à la motivation: tendance, instinct, besoin, vecteur psychique concu à la façon de Lewin. La Psychologie américaine à pendant longtemps tendu à restreindre le nombre de ces besoins, et à n'admettre comme tout à fait fondamentaux et originels que ceux qui concernent la nourriture et le sexe. II est impossible de comprendre les actions humaines si ľon ne réserve une place à des tendances, activités et satisfactions ?un ordre plus élevé. Notamment:1. Ľêtre vivant peut dépenser le surplus ?énergie dont il dispose dans des actions spontanées, non déclenchées par un stimulus externe. Ľaction trouve alors sa gratification en elle‐même et non dans le résultat qu'elle procure .2. Un plaisir supplémentaire peut résulter de la manière plus ou moins harmonieuse dont se déroule ľaction, indépendamment de ľeffet où elle arrive.3‐4. Il existe des besoins ?ordre mental oùľesprit cherche sa satisfaction propre et non celle de ľorganisme. On voit alors ľimagination ľemporter sur la perception et le donné s'analyser et se recomposer en créations originales. Ces besoins et les actes qu'ils provoquent procurent les trois sortes de plaisirs distingués plus haut. Leur but n'est pas préala‐blement donné, mais doit être construit pièce par pièce.5‐6. à côté des besoins positifs existent des besoins négatifs qui poussent àéviter, exclure, ou détruire. De même, aux besoins réactifs s'opposent les besoins proactifs, spontanés et créateurs. Les premiers peuvent devenir proréactifs par ľintervention de ľanticipation, les seconds réproactifs sous ľeffet de circonstances inattendues. Ces diverses sortes de conduites peuvent servir à classer les individus ?après la place considérable ou réduite qu'elles occupent dans son comportement.7. Les besoins se spécifient par canalisation ou cathection . Ils peuvent aussi par généralisation sétendre à de nouveaux objets. Ľexcès ou le manque absolu de fixation sont des symptômes ?immaturityé. – Une importance particulière revient, dans le cadre de cette théorie, à la notion freudienne de cathexis. Certains objets et buts sont adoptés à la faveur de circonstances où joue le trial and error. Dautres, purement idéaux àľorigine, sont recherchds par ľindividu sans jamais avoir été rencontrés par lui. Si le trial and error intervient ici, c'est sur le plan de ľimagination. – La Psychologie américaine à restreint en général la notion et le terme ?apprentissage àľacquisition des moyens de satisfaction àľexclusion des fins. De même, la civilisation contemporaine, si elle à prodigieusement développé’ les techniques, à perdu la notion ?un commun idéal humaniste. II importerait de revenir, ?un point de vue théorique non moins que pratique, àľapprentissage des fins, autrement dit au processus par lequel ľindividu, sous la poussée de besoins largement indifférenciés adopte tel nouveau but, s'attache à telle valeur, jugée par lui source de satisfaction.8. Les besoins peuvent être conscients ou inconscients. Dans le dernier cas, ľindividu les refoule sous la pression des impératifs sociaux. Ils se mafestent alors de diverses façons détournées, éventuellement névrotiques, et peuvent se retourner contre le sujet.9‐10. II existe un ordre ?urgence dans la satisfaction des besoins, les plus biologiques réclamant le plus impérieusement satisfaction, les plus Aleves et altruistes ne se faisant sentir qu'ensuite.11. La Psychologic sociale récente à artificiellement dissoci^ les notions ?inUret, attitude et valeur de celle de besoin. Mais la notion de besoin à son tour demande une analľse plus poussee. Le besoin comprend deux composantes : Ľaction à quoi il pousse ou vedeur proprement dit, la valeur ou entite valorisee au benefice de laquelle s'effectue cette action. Toute conduite concrete apparait alors comme un systéme valeur‐uecteur et peut être analľsee de ce double point de vue. (shrink)

Epistemologists often offer theories of justification without paying much attention to the variety and diversity of locutions in which the notion of justification appears. For example, consider the following claims which contain some notion of justification: B is a justified belief, S's belief that p is justified, p is justified for S, S is justified in believing that p, S justifiably believes that p, S's believing p is justified, there is justification for S to believe that p, there is (...) justification for S's believing p, and S has a justification for believing that p. In addition to these passive uses of the notion of justification, there are active uses as well: S justified his belief in p, believing e justifies believing p, etc. The syntactic variety involves semantic difference as well. For example, the proposition S has a justification for believing that p does not entail that S believes p, whereas the proposition S justifiably believes that p does entail that S believes p. Our ultimate goal is to show that this diversity is only superficial by arguing that there is a basic kind of justification. On the way, however, we shall argue that there are three central uses of a notion of justifica- tion in the above list: propositional justification (as in p is justified for S), personal justification (as in S is justified in believing that p) and doxastic justification (as in S's believing p is justified). Our preliminary argument will be that the multiplicity above can be explained in terms of these three locutions, and the substance of our argument will be to show that one of these three is the basic kind of justification. Success in this task will thereby justify, at least in part, the practice of contem- porary epistemologists. Our conclusions, however, shall not be of much comfort to contemporary epistemology, for the way in which the apparent diversity in the uses of the notion of justification is eliminated undermines much of recent epistemology. (shrink)

Readers are invited to the translation of the third chapter of the central work of A.N. Whitehead “Process and Reality” (1929), in which the author gives the final fundamental touches to the foundations of the process philosophy (philosophy of the organism), which he outlined in the first two chapters of this work, already translated into Russian. The third chapter touches on many aspects of all subsequent chapters, focusing on such categories as ‘the primary nature of God’, ‘creativity’, ‘societies’ (connections of (...) the basic elements of reality), atomism and continuity. The purpose of the explanatory article is to identify Whitehead’s innovative approach to the formation of fundamental categories of reality and experience, ignoring the principles of which can significantly complicate and distort the content of his philosophy. It also briefly discusses the principles of Whitehead’s philosophy in general, such as metaphysics and speculativeness, along with the radical empiricism and realism of his system. The consistent combination of these traditionally opposing features in the history of philosophy makes his system one of the most profound, innovative and paradigmatic metaphysics of the 20th century. (shrink)

This paper explores prevailing notions about gender, based on African realities, and their possible implications for the education of girls. Without ignoring the basic parameters articulated by European and American feminist movements, this paper takes the stand that an understanding of gender in the context of African realities is fundamentally connected to questions about the cultural identity, social experience, interests, and priorities of the purveyors of feminist knowledge or feminists positions across the African continent. The main goal is (...) to render the concept of gender, and subsequently girl-child education, within an approach that is more realistic and consistent with the history of women vis-à-vis their station in present-day, postcolonial Africa. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide some basic concepts in macrophenomenology. I will start with an exposition of the word “macrophenomenon,” its use and meaning in the phenomenological tradition. Specifically, I will focus on Merleau-Ponty’s lectures and manuscripts from 1959 to 1960. Once it is established that the word has had a meaning for the phenomenological tradition, I will ask what a macrophenomenon is. I will find, heavily relying on the late Merleau-Ponty, that they are global, (...) holistic large-scale phenomena, endowed with distinctive features. I will continue claiming that, since macrophenomena are intertwined with microphenomena in vertical and reversible relations, macrophenomenology is not the opposite but just the other side, the reverse, of micropohenomenology. Then I will briefly describe some central issues of the new ontology that Merleau-Ponty provides as a framework for understanding macrophenomena. I will focus on the key notions of the vertical Being and of emergent things. Next, I will follow an example that Merleau-Ponty borrows from Durkheim, and then add another one which I take from Garfinkel. I will end by summarizing the salient features of macrophenomena. (shrink)

Are there basic religious certainties? That is, are there any beliefs which religious people legitimately hold without the need for rational justification? The question has been tackled, in different ways, by both Hinge Epistemologists and by Reformed Epistemologists. For the former, discussion has revolved around very general religious beliefs such as ‘God exists’ (e.g. Pritchard, 2000; Helm, 2001; Hoyt, 2007; Ariso, 2020). Reformed Epistemologists, like Alvin Plantinga, argue that Christian theism and particular Christian beliefs are ‘properly basic’ in (...) that ‘I don’t believe them on the basis of any other propositions’ (Plantinga, 1981, p. 42). In this paper I want to do two things. First, I give an account of what basic religious certainty is from a Wittgensteinian, Hinge Epistemology point of view. On this account I will argue that the clearest examples of basic religious certainties are found in local, historical and more narrow expressions of religious belief, as opposed to the very general acontextual religious beliefs usually discussed. Secondly, I challenge the Reformed Epistemological notion that Christian doctrine can be ‘properly basic’, mainly by showing that the New Testament writers did not treat very general religious beliefs, such as ‘God exists’ or God is good’, as properly basic in either the Hinge or Reformed Epistemological ways. I will conclude by drawing out some implications for contemporary Christian epistemology. (shrink)

Synthetic biology is often understood in terms of the pursuit for well-characterized biological parts to create synthetic wholes. Accordingly, it has typically been conceived of as an engineering dominated and application oriented field. We argue that the relationship of synthetic biology to engineering is far more nuanced than that and involves a sophisticated epistemic dimension, as shown by the recent practice of synthetic modeling. Synthetic models are engineered genetic networks that are implanted in a natural cell environment. Their construction is (...) typically combined with experiments on model organisms as well as mathematical modeling and simulation. What is especially interesting about this combinational modeling practice is that, apart from greater integration between these different epistemic activities, it has also led to the questioning of some central assumptions and notions on which synthetic biology is based. As a result synthetic biology is in the process of becoming more “biology inspired.”. (shrink)

We present some new decision and comparison problems of unusually high computational complexity. Most of the problems are strictly combinatorial in nature; others involve basic logical notions. Their complexities range from iterated exponential time completeness to (0 time completeness to ((((,0) time completeness to ((((,,0) time completeness. These three ordinals are well known ordinals from proof theory, and their associated com- plexity classes represent new levels of computational complexity for natural decision problems. Proofs will appear in an (...) extended version of this manuscript to be published elsewhere. (shrink)

This article reconsiders Molefi Asante’s idea of Afrocentrism. It discusses Eurocentrism and the search for identity that provoked Afrocentrism as an intellectual paradigm. It details some basic tenets of the Afrocentric paradigm and makes some critical remarks on certain issues in the conceptualisation of the Afrocentric paradigm. Essentially, those remarks revolve around the notions of multiculturalism, identity and language. First, the article argues that the Afrocentric paradigm, through its openness to anyone interested in it – an (...) extension of its claim to multiculturalism – drags itself back into the problem of identity that it initially set out to resolve. This is because it provokes the dilemma of extreme inclusivity and extreme exclusivity. Second, it uses the language of Eurocentrism to fight against Eurocentrism, which seems absurd. Third, it glosses over the fact that, apart from Africa, other cultural civilisations might have significantly influenced the intellectual development of the ancient Geeks. The article argues, therefore, using the methods of analysis and critical argumentation typical of philosophical writing, first, that Afrocentrists may need to re-articulate the Afrocentric paradigm in such a way that would address the problem of identity which it set out to resolve by properly delineating its boundaries. Second, they need to address the language question, which is an important aspect of the problem of identity. Third, they need to recognise and respect the contributions of other cultural civilisations to the Greek intellectual development. This does not upset their multiculturalist programme. (shrink)

The notion of function is indispensable to our understanding of distinctions such as that between being broken and being in working order (for artifacts) and between being diseased and being healthy (for organisms). A clear account of the ontology of functions and functioning is thus an important desideratum for any top-level ontology intended for application to domains such as engineering or medicine. The benefit of using top-level ontologies in applied ontology can only be realized when each of the categories identified (...) and defined by a top-level ontology is integrated with the others in a coherent fashion. Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) has from the beginning included function as one of its categories, exploiting a version of the etiological account of function that is framed at a level of generality sufficient to accommodate both biological and artifactual functions. This account has been subjected to a series of criticisms and refinements. We here articulate BFO’s account of function, provide some reasons for favoring it over competing views, and defend it against objections. (shrink)

We characterize, more precisely than before, what Rawls calls the “analytical” method of drawing up a list of basic liberties. This method employs one or more general conditions that, under any just social order whatever, putative entitlements must meet for them to be among the basic liberties encompassed, within some just social order, by Rawls’s first principle of justice (i.e., the liberty principle). We argue that the general conditions that feature in Rawls’s own account of the analytical (...) method, which employ the notion of necessity, are too stringent. They ultimately fail to deliver as basic certain particular liberties that should be encompassed within any fully adequate scheme of liberties. To address this under-generation problem, we provide an amended general condition. This replaces Rawls’s necessity condition with a probabilistic condition and it appeals to the standard liberal prohibition on arbitrary coercion by the state. We defend our new approach both as apt to feature in applications of the analytical method and as adequately grounded in justice as fairness as Rawls articulates the theory’s fundamental ideas. (shrink)

In this paper non-Hausdorff manifolds as potential basic objects of General Relativity are investigated. One can distinguish four stages of identifying an appropriate mathematical structure to describe physical systems: kinematic, dynamical, physical reasonability, and empirical. The thesis of this paper is that in the context of General Relativity, non-Hausdorff manifolds pass the first two stages, as they enable one to define the basic notions of differential geometry needed to pose the problem of the evolution-distribution of matter and (...) are not in conflict with the Einstein equations. With regard to the third stage, various potential conflicts with physical reasonability conditions are considered with a tentative conclusion that non-Hausdorff manifolds are more likely to pass this stage than is typically assumed. When dealing with some of these problems, the modal interpretation of non-Hausdorff manifolds is invoked, according to which they represent bundles of alternative possible spacetimes rather than single spacetimes. (shrink)

The main objective of the paper is to provide a conceptual apparatus of a general logical theory of language communication. The aim of the paper is to outline a formal-logical theory of language in which the concepts of the phenomenon of language communication and language communication in general are defined and some conditions for their adequacy are formulated. The theory explicates the key notions of contemporary syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. The theory is formalized on two levels: token-level and (...) type-level. As such, it takes into account the dual – token and type – ontological character of linguistic entities. The basic notions of the theory: language communication, meaning and interpretation are introduced on the second, type-level of formalization, and their required prior formalization of some of the notions introduced on the first, token-level; among others, the notion of an act of communication. Owing to the theory, it is possible to address the problems of adequacy of both empirical acts of communication and of language communication in general. All the conditions of adequacy of communication discussed in the presented paper, are valid for one-way communication (sender-recipient); nevertheless, they can also apply to the reverse direction of language communication (recipient-sender). Therefore, they concern the problem of two-way understanding in language communication. (shrink)

G. A. Cohen argues that John Rawls’s focus on the basic structure of society as the exclusive subject of social justice is misguided. I argue that two understandings of the notion of basic structure seem to be present in the literature, either in implicit or in explicit terms. According to the first, the basic structure is to be equated with a given set of institutions: if they endorse the right principles of justice, the basic structure of (...) society is just; According to the second, a society has a just basic structure if and only if its institutional web manages to realize the relevant principles of justice as well it can. In, the institutional structure is not a given: different social circumstances call for different institutional solutions in order to achieve a just basic structure overall. The first part of the paper make a case for, and explores some of its normative implications. The second part asks which consequences this understanding may have for the idea of a global basic structure. (shrink)

The hypothesis that some moods are emotions has been rejected in philosophy, and is an unpopular alternative in psychology. This is because there is wide agreement that moods have a number of features distinguishing them from emotions. These include: lack of an intentional object and the related notion of lack of a goal; being of long duration; having pervasive or widespread effects; and having causes rather than reasons. Leading theories of mood have tried to explain these purported features by (...) describing moods as global changes in the mind affecting such things as predispositions to holding certain beliefs or the thresholds for triggering a range of relevant behaviors. I show instead that our best understanding of emotions can show that basic emotions either have or can appear to have each of these features. Thus, a plausible hypothesis is that certain moods are emotions. This theory is more parsimonious than the global change theories, and for this reason is to be preferred as an explanation of some moods. (shrink)

The article considers some basic notions of semiotics of mimesis by Juri Lotman, such as model, similarity, and relations between an object and its representation. The way Lotman defines and interprets these notions is compared with definitions given by adherents of the “semiotics of the transcendence” (German and Russian romanticism and Neoplatonism, Russian symbolism, theory of mystical symbol). A certain typological proximity ofsome important theoretical statements ensures the necessity to revise the traditional image of Tartu semiotics (...) as a purely positivistic school of thought. (shrink)

In this paper the author first presents a critical account of some basic views of Habermas' Discourse Philosophy. He points out some difficulties inherent in notions such as valid justification in argumentation theory, in the notion of ideal form of discourses, and in consensus theory of truth. Secondly, he focuses on Habermas' conceptions of validity, acceptance and legitimacy of law from the perspective of neo‐institutionalism. In particular, (i) the author argues that Habermas' definition of legal validity (...) is unclear and unrealistic; (ii) the author stresses the distinction between acceptance and acceptability; (iii) Habermas presupposes harmony between sovereignty and human rights postulates, but the present author takes into account the possibility of conflicts between autonomous popular decisions and human rights which must be resolved by methods of discursive democracy; (iv) criteria for acceptance of law cannot be fixed by a stipulative definition, but are in social discussion; (v) legitimacy is not an objective feature of valid law and presupposes an evaluation based on our political convictions. (shrink)

As the Preface notes, the present work "continues and concludes the task begun in part 1, titled The Furniture of the World--namely the building of an exact and systematic ontology consistent with contemporary science". As a continuation, it takes "for granted the basic notions analyzed and systematized in the companion volume, namely those of substance, property, thing, possibility, change, space and time". From this base Bunge continues the relatively recent burgeoning of General Systems Theory, exploiting "some concepts (...) and structural principles that seem to hold for systems of many kinds and... some modeling strategies--in particular the state space approach--that seem to work everywhere". "Because of its generality... [General Systems Theory, for which Bunge uses 'Systemics']... has a sizable overlap with ontology or metaphysics construed in the traditional pre-Hegelian sense as well as in our own sense of scientific ontology.... Both systemics experts and ontologists are interested in the properties common to all systems irrespective of their particular constitution...". (shrink)

There is no necessary connection between leadership in basic science and leadership in the applications of science, because scientific progress is a cooperative endeavour and not a competitive game; indeed, there may be a conflict between basic research and applied science. The notion of “a position of leadership”; in science raises questions of what leadership consists in and what its value is to the nation. The two main arguments for government support of science are cultural-social, and economic. The (...) cultural-social argument stresses scientific activity as a form of social consumption of wealth and raises the question of whether other uses of the resources employed would contribute more to the greatness of the society. The economic argument stresses basic scientific research as a form of investment for the future, and raises the questions of what the rate of return on such investment is and whether and to what extent government support is called for. Relevant economic research results bearing on this problem are scarce. Economic theory suggests that competition in the market will supply less than the optimal amount of basic research; but our society substantially supplements the market through private contributions to and government support of science, and the question is whether this supplementation is deficient or excessive. Here difficult problems arise, on which more economic research is needed; one of these concerns the relative merits of government and private support of science. The rule-of-thumb procedures generally recommended for determining the volume and allocation of government support to basic scientific research generally ignore these problems, and amount to endorsing the present level of government support or recommending that it be increased. Allocation of federal support of science should take account of the possibility of stimulating the economic development of poor regions of the country by locating scientific research facilities in them. (shrink)

Our knowledge, beliefs, doubts, etc., concern primarily logical constructions of propositions. If we assume that iterating ‘belief attitudes’ is valid, i.e., that the agent is perfectly introspective, he knows what he knows, believes, etc., then the so-called propositional attitudes are actually hyperintensional attitudes, i.e., they are relations of an agent to the construction–concept expressed by the embedded clause. Their implicit counterparts, relations of an agent to the proposition denoted by the embedded clause, are just idealised cases of an agent with (...) unlimited inferential abilities. On the other hand, our wishes, intentions, seeking, finding, etc., concern particular intensions, and the so-called notional attitudes are not hyperintensional. In the paper we formulate some criteria for notional attitudes and examine basic categories of them. In general, notional attitudes are relations-in-intension between an agent and an object to which the agent is intentionally related. Even relations of an agent to a proposition can be notional ones, in case there is no salient constructional counterpart, the attitude is not influenced by agent’s inferential abilities. Another problem we meet is the ambiguity of sentences expressing notional attitudes. These statements can often be read both in the de dicto and in the de re way. Yet, a common feature that characterizes notional attitudes is using the construction of the respective intension in the de dicto way. The respective intension is mentioned; referring on such a situation, the reporter may use any of the equivalent constructions of the intension, but not just a co-referring notion of another intension. Still, unlike the cases of relations of an agent to an individual when the respective individual office serves just as a pointer to the individual, when referring on notional attitudes the use of the respective notion of the intension is indispensable, which might perhaps justify calling such attitudes notional, though they actually are intensional. We also show that a passive form of a sentence cannot be usually read in the de dicto way. Thus a common belief at the equivalence of the active and passive form of a statement is generally not justified. (shrink)

The objective of the present work is to understand and elucidate Kant’s notion of category and how he derived the categories from a single transcendental principle. Kant did not put forward any definition of categories. He believed that categories cannot be defined without perpetrating a circle. Thus, he began his discourse with certain features of categories in his work Critique of Pure Reason. We have discussed the characteristic features of Kantian categories. An important point to be noted here is that (...) the categories, in the fullest Kantian sense of the term, must have a distinct property, namely that it should necessarily be applicable to all objects of knowledge. However, we are not concerned with the necessary applicability of concept to all objects of knowledge here in this paper. The analysis about the Kantian notion of categories, more importantly, necessitates a discussion about how he derived them from a single transcendental principle. Kant referred to the single principle which guides the search for the categories as “the clue to the discovery of the categories.” The specific and clear formulation of the principle which served as the transcendental clue to the discovery of the categories for Kant is that to every form of judgment there corresponds a pure and basic concept of the understanding. The forms of judgments and the categories both originate from the same source, namely, the function of the understanding, i.e., thinking. It may be noted here that the understanding is the power or faculty of knowing and thinking or judging is the function of understanding. Kant argued that the twelve logical forms of judgments provided the clue to the origin of twelve corresponding a priori concepts or categories. Two arguments provided by Kant in support of the principle serving as a transcendental clue to the discovery of the categories are analysed. An orthodox view held by some philosophers that for Kant the forms of judgment are forms of analytic judgment has been critically analyzed and is interpreted as erroneous. Keywords: category, judgment, understanding, categorematic, syncategorematic. (shrink)

The notion of a joint action is a familiar one in the philosophical literature. Moreover, the notion of epistemic action has recently been discussed in the literature. Elsewhere I have suggested that these two notions can be brought together to yield the notion of joint epistemic action and provided a relational individualist analysis of joint epistemic actions. In this article I extend this analysis and show how this extended analysis applies to different kinds of important epistemic institutional phenomena: voting (...) in a democracy; financial benchmarks, e.g. LIBOR rate) and; profiling using computer databases. Each of these institutional mechanisms is important in its own right. Moreover, each is a species of a more widespread generic social form that I refer to as joint institutional mechanisms which, I suggest, are ubiquitous yet somewhat diverse in character. Accordingly, there is a need to distinguish them from the more basic phenomenon of joint action but also to taxonomise them. The latter is a large task to which this article is a first step. (shrink)

One of the basic observations of the classical world is that physical entities are real and can be distinguished from each other. However, within quantum theory, the idea of physical realism is not well established. A framework to analyse how observations in experiments can be described using some physical states of reality was recently developed, known as ontological models framework. Different principles when imposed on the ontological level give rise to different theories, the validity of which can be (...) tested based on the statistics generated by these theories. Using the ontological models framework, we formulate a novel notion of classicality termed ontic-distinguishability, which is based upon the physical principles that in classical theories extremal states are physical states of reality and every sharp measurement observes the state of the system perfectly. We construct a communication task in which the success probability is bounded from above for ontological models satisfying the notion of ontic-distinguishability. Contrary to previous notions of classicality which either required systems of dimension strictly greater than two or atleast three preparations, a violation of ontic-distinguishability can be observed using just a pair of qubits and a pair of incompatible measurements. We further show that violation of previously known notions of classicality such as preparation non-contextuality and Bell’s local causality is a violation of ontic-distinguishability. (shrink)

This extended abstract summarises some of the basic points of AI ethics and policy as they present themselves now. We explain the notion of AI, the main ethical issues in AI and the main policy aims and means.

This article is a discussion of E. K. Emilsson, Plotinus (London and New York, 2017). Three themes are selected: causation; the holistic account of intelligible being; the status of matter and body. The discussion ends with some remarks about Emilsson’s approach to Plotinus’ philosophy. Emilsson’s account of Plotinus’ causation is based on the transmission model, what Emilsson calls ‘the principle of prior possession’. Here it is argued that the transmission model requires qualifications in order to be applied to Plotinus’ (...) account of causation. The section on Plotinus’ holism focuses on two analogies: that of science and its theorems and that of craftsmanship. The section on matter and body addresses the issue of Plotinus’ dualism as different from Cartesian dualism. The final remarks assess Emilsson’s philosophical approach to Plotinus, his use of contemporary philosophical notions, and the problem of Plotinus’ philosophical mysticism. (shrink)

There is another sort of ‘defense’ of relativism that I mention in conclusion. Sometimes one finds the view that one is rightly punished for a crime only if they admit committing it, and that it was a crime — something wrongly done: ‘punishment conditional on confession’ is the rule proposed. It might seem that this would give impunity to a criminal hardy enough to deny the fact, or the evil, of her deed; so it would, unless it was also understood (...) that if a person was proved by accepted standards to be the perpetrator of an action agreed to be wrong, the opportunity to admit guilt would extend from open questioning through beating to exquisite torture until confession was extracted (cf. the Chinese customs reflected in the Judge Dee stories of Robert Van Gulik). More often, one finds the view that a person is not refuted unless he admits this, and a view is not refuted — and so is not properly dismissed — unless its proponents concede defeat. A similar view is that all really telling philosophical criticism must be internal or else non-neutral (a view we discussed above).If one can in principle produce a conceptual system from a list of all propositions by following the recipe: for any proposition P include P, or else include not-P, in S, then (providing one adds no constraints concerning consistency) there will be no proposition that will appear in all conceptual systems. If what it is for a proposition to be neutral is for it to appear in all conceptual systems, then no proposition is neutral. But of course, the same recipe that produces this result produces the result that the proposition (P) Some proposition is both true and false appears in some conceptual system which (since the denial of (P) appears in less than all systems and hence is not neutral) is (allegedly) none the worse for that. And the proposition (P1) Conceptual relativism is false appears in some conceptual systems which (since the denial of (P1) appears in less than all systems and hence is not neutral) is none the worse for that. But then what remains of the claim that conceptual relativism is true?Sometimes refuted is used in a person-independent manner: Proposition P is (and always was) refuted by the fact that F uses P is refuted in such a way that it does not entail There is someone who refuted P. Sometimes, of course, it is so used that P is refuted does have that entailment. Even in the latter case, refutation is an epistemological notion, and Person S is refuted does not entail S knows that S is refuted and is compatible with S believes that S is not refuted. The recommendation that we add a psychological component of ‘admits to’ to the epistemological notion ‘being refuted’ seems to have no other ground than the arbitrary one that if we do we shall then be able better to defend relativism.While the recipe for constructing conceptual systems suggested above may seem useful to a relativist — it gives one clear content to ‘neutral proposition’ — it has what must surely seem a defect to the relativist, namely that given it (even with consistency constraints added) there will be no translational incommensurability. For if P is contained in system S, then not-P is expressible in S, and conversely. And the recipe yields the result that for any proposition P, and any system S, S contains either P or else not-P.This, of course, brings out an ambiguity in ‘contains’. In one sense, a system ‘contains (1)’ whatever can be expressed in it. In another, it ‘contains (2)’ whatever, according to it, is true. If it is a complete system without suspense of judgment it contains (1) twice the propositions it contains (2). Further, a system contains (1) lots of propositions it (or its proponent) does not regard as true, and so the fact that a proposition P appears in system S does not mean that P favors S. One often at least can state the conditions of S's falsehood in S, and even prove in S that S is false, where “in” is used in the sense of “contains (1).”Sophisticated relativism, then, seems no more plausible, no more free from inconsistency, and no less open to devastating critique than are its less cultured relatives. Relativism, at least in the varieties discussed here, seems to live up to its unsavory reputation. Since not even translation incommensurability seems to entail lack of cognitive competitiveness, it seems that it will have to be admitted that, regarding apparent disagreement on basic matters — including fundamental religious disagreement — the appearance is also the reality. People do uneliminably disagree, and short of conversion or (what will seem from within the religious perspective in question) some other ‘failure in faith’ (e.g., coming to reject all religious views) will continue to do so. Whatever can be done in terms of common understanding and common humanitarian endeavors must be done without denying the many basic disagreements that there are. And whatever notion of inter-faith dialogue is other than espitemically defective will have to face that fact; for significant dialogue based on self-deception or on falsehood seems not a terribly promising enterprise. (shrink)

During the past decade there has been a very effective campaign against any explanation of remembering whose basic concept is that of a causally mediating trace. This paper attempts to provide such an explanation by presenting an explicit deductive argument for the existence of the memory trace. The conclusion is shown to follow from reasonable, empirical assumptions of which the most interesting is a spatiotemporal contiguity thesis. Set-theoretic techniques are used to provide a framework of analysis and probabilistic definitions (...) of some causal notions, as that of a causal chain, are presented. (shrink)

In this article, I want to demonstrate the possibility of a normative theory which, if true, would make it impossible to think of God as morally good and therefore would “disqualify” him as God. I call this theory negative altruism (NA) and regard it as the true basis of social morality, as well as the appropriate normative foundation of antitheism. The article is structured as follows: first, I clarify some basic notions I proceed from (such as antitheism, (...) axiological atheism and normative pluralism), second, I describe the normative logic of NA, and then I show why it makes impossible to present any theoretically conceivable creator of this universe as morally good. Lastly, after some remarks on why I find NA preferable to alternative normative theories, I explain in which sense it leads to antitheism. (shrink)

Does a penny per month constitute a Basic Income? Were that penny to be paid individually, universally, and unconditionally, the answer would be ‘yes’, following the definition of Basic Income given by some of its leading advocates, be it organisations like the Basic Income Earth Network or prominent scholars such as Philippe Van Parijs. Some might be puzzled as to how this could be ‘a capitalist road to communism’, or give us ‘freedom as the power (...) to say no’, both of which have been advocated by prominent researchers. The purpose of this paper is not to argue for or against their definition, but rather to situate it historiographically, enabling fruitful discussion. The paper will show how there was a widely shared assumption in the 1970s and 80s, at the early stages of both academic articulations and public discussion, that Basic Income comes with some notion of a threshold or level to be taken as a minimum or as adequate. The paper goes on to outline three issues that arise once the concept of a threshold is dropped from the definition. Examined in addition are five justifications for doing so. Much like any other idea, the concept of Basic Income is a social construct. By situating it here within a historical perspective, we wish to facilitate academic discussion regarding both the achievements and erasures that have occurred as a consequence of the concept’s academic refinement—refinement that is in itself majorly indebted to BIEN and Van Parijs. (shrink)

In this paper being a sequel to our [1] the logic with semi-negation is chosen as an example to elucidate some basic notions of the semantics for sentential calculi. E.g., there are shown some links between the Post number and the degree of complexity of a sentential logic, and it is proved that the degree of complexity of the sentential logic with semi-negation is 20. This is the first known example of a logic with such a (...) degree of complexity. The results of the final part of the paper cast a new light on the scope of the Kripke-style semantics in comparison to the matrix semantics. (shrink)

Starting from the context in which Wittgenstein thinks of the concepts of “seeing-as” and “hearing-as”, the basic relation is clarified between the question of representation, musical understanding, and the theory of musical expressiveness. The points of views of Wollheim, Scruton, Levinson, and Ridley are discussed, in a re-consideration of the notions of hearing and understanding within Wittgenstein’s “last philosophy”.

This volume may be of interest for all those who wish that philosophy had a scientific character. As an adherent of the Polish Lvov-Warsaw Philosophical School, the author of this collection of papers endeavours to clarify some basic notions of epistemology, ontology and psychology of cognitive acts, such as judgment, existence, being etc. In his investigations he refrains from unnecessary rejection of common-sense knowledge but at the same time searches for suitable patterns in contemporary sciences. Regarding formal (...) logic as a fundamental tool for the precise expression and justification of thoughts, the author tries to clear logic from ontological commitments, shows how to construct logic of norms and how to use safely different definitions in research works. The book presents a new conception of antinomies and an innovatory approach to realistic epistemology. Moreover, some applications of logical methods are illustrated by examples of semantical analyses of the general notion of similarity and the biological concept of homology. (shrink)

For much of its modern history, the notion of talent has been associated with the idea of ‘careers open to talent’. Its emancipatory promise of upward social mobility has radically transformed the distribution of advantaged social positions and has had a lasting influence on the very idea of social status itself. Nevertheless, unlike concepts traditionally associated with distributive justice, e.g. fairness, (in)equality, desert, equality of opportunity as well as justice itself, the notion of talent has received only limited examination. This (...) article discusses some of the most pressing problems and challenges arising out of a reductionist understanding of talents’ anatomy and a distorted characterization of their overall distributive value. In particular, it aims to address those issues revolving around talents’ anatomy existing conceptions of distributive justice leave either neglected or outrightly ignored. The introductory part outlines the basic egalitarian conception of equal opportunities and then proceed with the examination of fairness embedded in it. The central part of the paper identifies the key elements of talents’ anatomy. We then discuss some of the implications egalitarianism either leaves out of the discussion or neglects. In particular, we challenge the idea of moral arbitrariness as the key mechanism to discard talents as a form of unfair advantage in the process of competition for advantaged social positions. In the final part, we outline two fundamental problems that call into question the cogency of egalitarian conceptions of talent(s) as a form of unfair disadvantage. (shrink)

In this paper we steer a course between two views of the value of equality that are usually understood as diametrically opposed to one another: on the one hand, the view that equality has intrinsic value; on the other, the view that equality is a normatively redundant notion. We proceed by analysing the different ways in which the equal possession of certain relevant properties justifies distributive equality. We then present an account of ‘basic equality’ that serves to single out (...) where this equal possession is really doing normative work. Our account departs from some common assumptions about basic equality but is nevertheless plausible in as much as it assigns to that concept a precise and normatively significant role in grounding the non-instrumental value of distributive equality. By showing when, exactly, equality is basic, we are able to explain both what is right and what is wrong in each of the two opposed views of the value of equality. The argument proceeds at a fairly high level of abstraction and is therefore applicable to a number of rival egalitarian theories. (shrink)

This essay provides a framework of concepts and principles suitable for systematic discussion of issues surrounding expertise. Expertise creates inequality. Its multiple benefits and the creativity of technology lead to a society replete with expertises. The basic binds of expertise derive from the desire of non-experts to be able to both enjoy what expertise offers and insure that it is exercised in the social interest. This involves trusting the exercise of expertise, involuntarily or voluntarily. A healthy society provides various (...) means to move trust from involuntary to voluntary. The social means for achieving this are laid out. The purpose of this short essay is to briefly lay out a conceptual framework within which to construct, clarify, evaluate and apply expertises. It is not to promote some particular notion of expertise over others, or to review the vast literatures, such as that on trust in science, that make up the domain. A few notes on one work towards this essay’s close may indicate what a major, and expert, process this would be. (shrink)

A universal basic income is an unconditional allowance, sufficient to live on, paid in cash to every citizen regardless of income. It has been a Green Party policy for years. But the idea raises many interesting philosophical questions, about fairness, entitlement, desert, stigma and sanctions, the value of unpaid work, the proper ambitions of a good society, and our preconceptions about whether leisure or jobs are the thing we should prize above all for free citizens. Coming from the perspective (...) of ancient philosophy, I consider the answers offered in the ancient world to some of these questions, and how we might learn from rethinking our notions of how to create a good society in which people can be free and realise their creative and intellectual potential. (shrink)

The principal aim of this paper is to present a construction method for nontotal extensional combinatory algebras. This is done in $\S2$ . In $\S0$ we give definitions of some basic notions for partial combinatory algebras from which the corresponding notions for (total) combinatory algebras are obtained as specializations. In $\S1$ we discuss some properties of nontotal extensional combinatory algebras in general. $\S2$ describes a "partial" variant of reflexive complete partial orders yielding nontotal extensional combinatory (...) algebras. Finally, $\S3$ deals with properties of the models constructed in $\S2$ , such as incompletability, having no total submodel and the pathological behaviour with respect to the interpretation of unsolvable λ-terms. (shrink)

It is now well known that, on pain of triviality, the probability of a conditional cannot be identified with the corresponding conditional probability [25]. This surprising impossibility result has a qualitative counterpart. In fact, Peter Gärdenfors showed in [13] that believing ‘If A then B’ cannot be equated with the act of believing B on the supposition that A — as long as supposing obeys minimal Bayesian constraints. Recent work has shown that in spite of these negative results, the question (...) ‘how to accept a conditional?’ has a clear answer. Even if conditionals are not truth-carriers, they do have precise acceptability conditions. Nevertheless most epistemic models of conditionals do not provide acceptance conditions for iterated conditionals. One of the main goals of this essay is to provide a comprehensive account of the notion of epistemic conditionality covering all forms of iteration. First we propose an account of the basic idea of epistemic conditionality, by studying the conditionals validated by epistemic models where iteration is permitted but not constrained by special axioms. Our modeling does not presuppose that epistemic states should be represented by belief sets (we only assume that to each epistemic state corresponds an associated belief state). A full encoding of the basic epistemic conditionals (encompassing all forms of iteration) is presented and a representation result is proved. In the second part of the essay we argue that the notion of change involved in the evaluation of conditionals is suppositional, and that such notion should be distinguished from the notion of updating (modelled by AGM and other methods). We conclude by considering how some of the recent modellings of iterated change fare as methods for iterated supposing. (shrink)

The main aims of this paper are two: first, to show that the current situation of History of Logic is far from being satisfactory, and second, to put forward a programme for its improvement. To this end it is as well, I think, to take into account a new conceptual and historiographical approach to growth of Iogic as a discipline, some basic notions in this regard -e.g., the notion of being a contribution to develop ment of Iogic-, (...) and some others compIementary aspects, commonly neglected by the History of Logic scholars. (shrink)

In the course of a study of elementary particles, an analysis is given of a fundamental presupposition of many research programs, namely the belief in the ultimate unity of physics. It is argued tht this unity-idea is incorrect. By classical physics, relativity theory and quantum theory three distinct structures of nature are revealed. Next, the essential aspect of measurement, that a measurement always results in a record, is analysed. Recording implies irreversibility and entropy production. In modern elementary particle physics the (...) record itself is all important, and therefore the entropy production due to measurement is essential. It is argued that this aspect of measurement will play a central role in a distinct theory concerning fundamental characteristics of elementary particles, revealing a fourth structure of physical reality. Some basic notions of this new theory are proposed. Finally the meaning of irreversibility on the micro-level of elementary particles is discussed, in connection with the concept of time. (shrink)

Along with the notion of being a person (zuo ren 做人), the notion of doing business (zuo shi 做事) in ordinary Chinese is basically an over-all notion of the norms in the practical and associative activities, carrying typically obscure meanings on practice and association affairs in some external world. Ordinary Chinese not only distinguishes these two notions but also defines a dictionary order of them, with the affairs of the internal world prior to those of the external. The (...) fact that the notion of doing business refers to business (shi 事) rather than person (ren 人) makes this order clear at a deeper level. It shows that this notion regards the practical affairs of the external world less important to the person itself than those of the internal. Except for these qualities, the notion of doing business holds some normative meanings, although contains no definite rules. These meanings indirectly relate to the notion of person that people form in their private associations and emerge as some mixture with a tactical attitude out of the need of earning a life. The notion of person gives birth to some obscure requirements, for instance, the requirement of 'doing business in accordance with your conscience' and that of 'doing business seriously'. The core world of family is marginalized in the public transition of associations. There are reasons to anticipate that in this process the notion of doing business will undergo more radical changes than that of being a person. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Advances in Peircean Mathematics: The Colombian School ed. by Fernando ZalameaGianluca CaterinaFernando Zalamea (Ed.) Advances in Peircean Mathematics: The Colombian School Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2022. 212 pp. (incl. index).The volume Advances in Peircean Mathematics is an important, very much needed contribution towards a deeper understanding of the impact of Peirce's work especially in the fields of mathematics, logic, and semiotic. It fills a gap in the current (...) literature by recasting some of [End Page 373] Peirce's profound mathematical insights into a formal framework. This is a finely edited editorial project, which summarizes the work of more than two decades done by a group of scholars—the Colombian School—lead by Fernando Zalamea, a pioneer of Peirce studies, and pragmatism in general, in Latin America.The structure of the volume unfolds in three dense chapters, each corresponding to a specific mathematical context connected to various aspects of Peirce's work. Broadly speaking, in the first chapter, Gustavo Arengas proposes the theory of higher category theory as a natural framework to represent the main traits of Peirce's semiotic; in the second chapter, Francisco Vargas develops a thorough set-theoretical model of Peirce's continuum; in the third chapter, Arnold Oostra, in a truly Peircean spirit, formalizes the notion of Intuitionistic Existential Graphs, emphasizing the idea that intuitionistic logic is the most natural context to represent and understand Peirce's diagrammatic logic. The fourth and last chapter, penned by Zalamea, provides the reader with a solid summary of the main results presented in the volume along with a robust road map to navigate through the technical details of the text.Mathematics, as implied by the title of the volume, is at the core of this project, and the authors do not shy away from the complexity, details, and depth of it in order to shed light on some of the most fundamental and groundbreaking nature of Peirce's ideas. That level of rigor and formal soundness is certainly one of the strengths of the volume, although readers who may not be acquainted with at least some basic notions of category theory or with the mathematics of Peirce's work, may find some of the text a bit terse—this is not a casual reading and it does require a certain level of commitment in order to appreciate the depth of the provided insights. On the other hand, all the background material is clearly laid out, making the volume a self-contained work which can be thoroughly enjoyed by a general audience.The real upshot of recasting some of Peirce's intuitions within the fabric of formal mathematics is not only that of providing the instruments to clarify those ideas, but also that of highlighting the role that Peirce's work has been playing in the development of modern mathematics in many relevant aspects, from the very genesis of category theory—which today is widely regarded as a necessary and unifying language in several fields of the mathematical and physical sciences—to the development of non-standard analysis, just to mention a few of them.An elegant instance of such perspective is offered by Gustavo Arengas in the first chapter, where it is argued that ∞-categories can be used to model the natural order of hierarchies implicit in Peirce's conception of the basic triadic relation between sign, object, and interpreter. What, at first glance, may seem just a simple analogy, unfolds onto a methodical and enlightening analysis of Peirce's semiotic, as the author builds [End Page 374] the connections with the relevant categorical constructions in a precise manner. Most of the rest of the chapter focuses on Peirce's notions of the pragmatic and pragmaticist maxim, and the use of basic structures such as monads, limits, presheaves and sheaves as the natural environment to better convey their meaning, both from a mathematical and a philosophical perspective. The reader will find it interesting to realize that, by delving deeper into the understanding of the relational nature of category theory, a great chunk of Peirce's work can be seen as fundamentally intertwined with the apparatus and the language of modern mathematics... (shrink)

The present article, which is a revised version of part of [Hu1], deals with various relations between models which might serve as exact formulations for the vague concept "similar" or "almost isomorphic". One natural class of such formulations is equivalence in a given logic. Another way to express similarity is by potential isomorphism, i.e., isomorphism in some extension of the set-theoretic universe. The class of extensions may be restricted to give different notions of potential isomorphism. A third method (...) is to study the winning strategies for an Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse-game played between the two models, and the properties of the resulting equivalence and nonequivalence trees. The basic question studied here is whether one such notion of similarity implies another. Some implications and counterexamples listed in this part are previously known or trivial, but all are mentioned for completeness' sake. Only models of cardinality ℵ 1 are considered. Some results are therefore connected with the Continuum Hypothesis. (shrink)

Some general, programmatic points about informal logic are addressed. The informal approach to argument analysis faces serious foundational problems which have been recognized by its practitioners – but informal logic has yet to come together as a clearly defined discipline. Another problem is the dilemma of the dialectician (Sextus Empiricus): informal logic is either trivial or powerless on its own (field expertise is needed). According to Johnson and Blair the central notion in theory of argument is cogency which replaces (...) soundness. An argument is cogent if and only if (i) its premises are rationally acceptable, (ii) its premises are relevant to its conclusion and (iii) its premises provide sufficient reason to accept the conclusion. I propose to understand cogency as a broader notion that includes deductively valid inferences. The criteria of cogency are simply the basic ideals of scientific methodology which requires a respect for available evidence and “reasonable” inference, an awareness of alternatives and a willingness to modify or reject those beliefs that fail to conform to the evidence. Informal logic in the sense of elementary scientific methodology is concerned with proper reasoning and not with proper dialogue. Informal logic involves non-trivial argumentativeskills and abilities applied to the subject area and accessible to every normally intelligent and educated person. (shrink)

We argue that there are three coherent, nontrivial notions of basic-ness: conceptual basic-ness, biological basic-ness, and psychological basic-ness. There is considerable evidence for conceptually basic emotion categories (e.g., “anger,” “fear”). These categories do not designate biologically basic emotions, but some forms of anger, fear, and so on that are biologically basic in a sense we will specify. Finally, two notions of psychological basic-ness are distinguished, and the evidence for them (...) is evaluated. The framework we offer acknowledges the force of some of the objections to basic emotion theory whilst demonstrating that the notion of a basic emotion, once properly reformulated, is still of scientific value. (shrink)

Did Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, or other "poststructuralist" theorists writing in the wake of May '68 come up with any good ideas about authorship and related topics in the philosophy of literature? The three volumes under review have a common point of departure in that broad question, but offer a number of contrasting responses to it. In what follows I describe and assess some of the various perspectives on offer in these 700 or so pages. The short (...) answer to my initial question comes at the end. Carla Benedetti's book was first published in 1999 in Milan as L'ombra lunga dell'autore: Indagine su una figura cancellata. Professor of Italian and Theory of Literature at the University of Pisa, and Recurrent Visiting Professor at NYU, she clearly shares some of Foucault's basic assumptions about authorship: "It is the reader or viewer who transforms the artist's selections, which in themselves may even be random or compelled, into subjective choices endowed with intentionality: that intentionality that is capable of providing meaning and artistic value to what we are viewing or reading" (p. 12). Benedetti contends that such attributions are a necessary part of the literary and artistic discursive formation of modernity, and she persuasively demonstrates that the author has not "disappeared," in spite of what Barthes and others may have thought or wished. According to Benedetti, authorialism, or the thesis that artistic value can only derive from original authorship, is the product of a modern ideology. She contends that a self-reflexive, late modernist train of thought generates a highly problematic relation to authorship and such related notions as genius, novelty, and creativity. More specifically, Benedetti finds a Batesonian double bind or paradoxical injunction in modernity's incessant demand for an extreme form of novelty. As soon as something innovative has been done, yet another innovation is desired. Not only does it become harder and harder to make a radically new move in the game, but the entire pursuit appears to be hopeless. Although Benedetti does not say so, the key thought was neatly captured by Oscar Wilde when he quipped: "Nothing is so dangerous as being too modern; one is apt to grow old-fashioned quite suddenly." To be old-fashioned is abhorrent, yet to try to obey the injunction to be "absolutely modern" is to risk becoming old-fashioned in a hurry, so failure seems inevitable. One of the constitutive myths of late modernity has it, then, that artistic activity must be recognized as authorless because it is impossible to create some sort of fundamentally novel work of lasting value. For those in the grip of this unsound thought, it seems necessary to conclude that the writer-no-longer-author must be recognized as an essentially uncreative epigone. Benedetti comments rather sweepingly, "All that poststructuralist thought speaks of, in its multifarious elaborations, is merely our supposed irreversible impossibility to create" (p. 202). She links Derrida's rejection of the possibility of decisive epistemological "ruptures" to the same late modernist mythology. Benedetti concludes her book by saying that the late modernist mythology conflates one kind of novelty with the new in general. This distinction sounds promising, but is not developed any further, and this reader was left wondering how the putative crippling error of a vast artistic dispensation could be revealed by means of a distinction between two kinds of newness. I also wonder whether her diagnosis probes deeply enough into the sources and nature of the modish sensibility that leads perversely to the Last Year in Marienbad syndrome. Not everyone is equally interested in trying to be dazzlingly innovative and fashionable; some who do have this inclination manage to produce excellent works of art; and many artists active in the period in question have not worked with the assumptions Benedetti criticizes. Whatever one thinks about Benedetti's Foucauldian premises about authorship, her book is highly informative, engaging, and replete with astute comments on a wide range of European literary and artistic movements and critical trends. With a keen eye for significant detail, she writes elegantly and discusses many fascinating examples, including interesting, lesser-known Italian ones. A variety of perspectives on authorship are presented.. (shrink)